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ABSTRACT  
Consistently poor economic performance in Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa 
has led to pressure on governments from civil society, which has in turn led to 
authoritarianism and a search for compliance that has drawn the military into politics and 
finally into government. Military governments have performed equally poorly in 
economic management and governance and have relied on the civilians they had 
overthrown to govern. Likewise, civilian administrations have relied upon, and 
manipulated the military institution and structures thereby politicizing the military and 
restarting the cycle of military intervention. This cycle has repeated itself several times in 
the post colonial period and any effort to design a system for preventing military 
interventions must address itself to this cycle. The thesis will also show that the 
relationships between the military, the executive branch, Ministry of Defense and the 
legislature are very important in ensuring effective civil-military relations and breaking 
the cycle of military interventions. In addition, a balance of the activities of the 
intelligence agencies, which must operate in secrecy but with some form of transparency 
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The consistently poor economic performance in Ghana and elsewhere in West 
Africa has led to pressure on governments from civil society, which has in turn led to 
authoritarianism and a search for compliance, which has drawn the military into politics 
and finally into government. I will again argue that the military governments that have 
emerged have performed equally poorly in economic management and governance and 
have relied on the civilians they had overthrown to govern. The civilian administrations 
have also relied and manipulated the military institution and structures to govern thereby 
making the military apolitical. This cycle has repeated itself several times in the post 
colonial period and any effort to design a system for preventing military interventions 
must address itself to this cycle as being important in military intervention. The creation 
of parallel security forces, usually ethnically based, as counter-weights to the established 
armed forces has also been a problem with civil-military relations and has in some cases 
resulted in military coups. 
The thesis will also show that the relationships between the military, the executive 
branch, Ministry of Defense and the legislature are very important in ensuring effective 
civil-military relation and a balance of the activities of the intelligence agencies, which 
must operate in secrecy with some form of transparency, is very important in democratic 
consolidation. I will finally come up with a framework which I believe if followed will 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A.   RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
The military in Ghana, just like most of the countries in the West Africa, has been 
directly involved in politics since independence. Attempts by government after 
government to keep the military out of politics and direct rule have failed in both Ghana 
and the rest of West Africa. Even after successful attempts had been made to transition 
back to democracy in Ghana, the military intervened to stop the progress. The first and 
most obvious question is whether the military can be prevented from initially intervening, 
reintervening, and from threatening to do so in order to shape the new political order in 
accordance with its interests. This is not a problem easily resolvable by constitutional and 
legal bans against coups. The answer does not lie in the military establishment but in a 
democratic institution functioning effectively and remaining legitimate; in an active civil 
society in which social and political forces remain strong enough to deter military 
intervention; in economies that grow and redistribute resources minimizing discontent 
and conflict; and in an international environment supporting democratic institutions.1      
The macro-economic strategies pursued in Ghana since its independence have 
been influenced by both mainstream economic development thoughts of the day and the 
political ambitions of the leaders of the country. These socio-economic demands led to 
the rapid establishment of state enterprises and nationalization of few private ones. The 
public service sector was equally enlarged to accommodate the administrative 
requirements of economic development experiments. The rapid creation of these 
organizations and expansion of the public sector had major consequences on 
management. This growth exerted a severe strain on balancing payments in the economy 
and set in motion a spiral of economic problems that presently characterize the social and 
economic environment in Ghana. 
                                                 
1 Robin Luckham, Transition to Democracy and the Control over Ghana’s Military and Security 
Establishment. (CODESRIA, UK 1998) p.141 
1 
In Ghana, like the other developing countries, the labor market posed a major 
problem for the economy and policy-making. The labor market has the persistent 
challenge of efficiently generating sufficient jobs to absorb the growing labor force and 
to avoid mass unemployment, especially among the youth. Even though, the country was 
faced with the microeconomic issues of stabilizing growth to hold down inflationary 
pressures, wage differentials within the public sector, as well as, between the public and 
the private sectors were significant in allocating skills, which were scarce, for effective 
use. A more skilled workforce was a precondition for increasing productivity. The labor 
market happened to be the most important source of income and, therefore, a crucial 
influence on the distribution of income and poverty. Not surprisingly, the labor market is 
highly politicized through the activities of trade unions. This has resulted in every 
governments attempting to have firm control of Trade Union activities. 
Policy initiative in and out of the labor market must directly address economic 
and political realities and the goals of development. These must include industrialization 
and not rest upon the notion that labor markets will work better, the more they are 
allowed to conform to the ideal of perfect competition. Ghana was one of the first 
countries on the African continent to appreciate the negative consequences of rapid 
population growth and the need to manage it. Even though the Governments made efforts 
to strengthen the economy by controlling the population, its growth rate constrained 
development by increasing pressure on scarce public resources and other social 
amenities, worsening an already weak economy. The military regimes failed to recognize 
this concept because their lack of expertise resulted in making the economic situation 
worse each time a regime returned to power supported by some ambitious civilians. 
2 
Democratization is normally initiated outside the state, through the struggles of 
groups in civil society, or in response to international pressures, like those exerted on 
most of the African State under the rubric of “political conditionality.” Nevertheless, 
hegemonic or institutional crises within authoritarian regimes and their military and 
repressive apparatuses also play a central role. Ghana on gaining independence from 
Britain in 1957 under Dr Kwame Nkrumah proceeded to set up a highly centralized state 
designed to transform it into a socialist society. Three years later, Ghana became a 
republic and severed its residual link to the British crown. Nkrumah scrapped Ghana’s 
Western-style political institutions and proclaimed himself president for life with his 
political party as the only legal party. Ghana, thus, became an authoritarian regime,2 
which, therefore, neither had to be popular nor legitimate to survive. Such regimes 
required compliance rather than consent. However compliance has to be organized and 
authoritarian regimes have to invest in a means of physical coercion in the military and 
police establishments, which developed them; this exposes the military to politics. 
Regimes must be able to control the military, which is just as difficult for an authoritarian 
government as democratic one.  
Authoritarian regimes that Ghana had applied brute military force as a means of 
getting compliance, including political surveillance, intelligence networks, patronage and 
control of the media. The regimes then incorporated ideological rationales for repression, 
in terms of national security or development, attempting to convince powerful interests, 
for instance, business elites or the civilian bureaucracy, that even if they lack legitimacy, 
they are at least effective in managing the economy. Whatever legitimacy might accrue 
from this is undermined when it become clear that these regimes are in fact not effective 
in managing the economy. This weakness is not debilitating in authoritarian regime or 
military rule unless the ruling group’s monopoly of violence and its capacity of assuring 
continued compliance comes into question. Once this happens, cracks rapidly open in the 
edifice of power, political forces acquire space in which to organize and demonstrate that 
they can get away with disobedience, and regimes rapidly look more fragile. The military 
at this point, in most cases, negotiates its way or is drawn into politics. The military, now 
feeling equal to the civilians in the governance of a nation, finds it difficult to subordinate 
itself to civilian control when a democratic transition occurs. 
 
B.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Even though a lot of literature is available on civil military relations and transition 
to democratic rule, few resources can be found on Ghana. All the literature that has been 
produced is on transition to democratic rule, forms of military rule, military in politics, 
                                                 
2 John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China.  Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River New York.  This is an analysis of China’s quest to spread socialism to the Third World by offering 
economic assistance in the form of aid. 
3 
and some accounts on the involvement of the military. Nothing has been written on civil 
military relationship with the purpose of preventing coups. In the review of the literature, 
therefore, I will focus on good civil military relations as seen by some experts in the field 
and apply this to Ghana. Civil-military relations have been a source of concern for 
countries in the emerging democratic dispensation of the Third World after the collapse 
of the Cold War.  This concern exists because the process of democratization tends to put 
the military, which hitherto controlled so much power at the state level, under civilian 
control.  
This literature review will first define good civil-military relations as seen by 
some authors in establishing effective civilian control of the military to prevent military 
interventions. The literature uses Ghana as a case study in analyzing how civil-military 
relations can best lead to effective civilian control of the military. Finally, It discusses the 
relative weight of structure vs. human agency for attaining good civil-military relations 
and democratic civilian control of the military.     
In his book The Soldier and The State, Samuel Huntington describes civil-military 
relations as an aspect of national security policy.  He sees the military institution as 
operating from two forces; a functional imperative, stemming from the threats to the 
society’s security, and a societal imperative, arising from the social forces, ideologies and 
institutions dominant within society. He believes that balancing these two forces results 
in good civil-military relations.  Huntington goes further to explain subjective civilian 
control, which civilianizes the military making them the mirror of the State, and objective 
civilian control, which militarizes the military making it the tool of the state. Subjective 
civilian control exist in many forms; whereas, objective civilian control has only one.3 
Ghana in its effort at democratic consolidation desires full objective civilian control 
because the prime aim for any system of civilian control is to have strong, and 
nonpolitical military. Objective civilian control will achieve this reduction while, at the 
same time, increasing professionalism of the military thereby making it apolitical. 
In defining good civil military relations, Douglas L. Bland sets up four 
benchmarks in which conditions must exist in a nation state: 
                                                 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. (New York Vintage Books 1957)  pages 2 & 83 
4 
(i) Acknowledge distinct civil and military spheres 
(ii) Explain the factors that shape how civilians exercise control over the 
military 
(iii) Transcend the concept of professionalism  
(iv) Derive it deductively before empirically testing it against the historical 
records 
He also favored the theory of a shared responsibility for good civil military 
relations, in which various players work within a known regime in which the rules of the 
game and the sanctions for breaking the rules are understood and generally agreed upon.4 
The rules and sanctions must be binding on the armed forces and the civilian leaders.  
Bland also supports objective civilian control for good civil-military relations. 
Peter D. Feaver sees good civil-military relations as a challenge in reconciling a 
military strong enough to do whatever the civilians request and a military subordinate 
enough to do only what civilians authorize.5  For good civil-military relations, balance is 
required between the protection by the military and protection from the military since any 
effort to assure one side complicates effort to assure the other.  Feaver further noted that 
objective civilian control signifies autonomous military professionalism.  He pointed out 
that interference or meddling in military affairs undermines military professionalism and 
so undermines objective control. Objective civilian control also weakens the military 
politically and facilitates it’s voluntary subordination to civilian control. 
Henry H. Gaffney, Jr. recognizes that for the military to function effectively and 
have good civil-military relations, effective civilian control is essential.  He further 
outlines the following requirements that are to be met and referred to as the basic rules 
for effective civil-military relations: 
(i) The minister of defense should be a civilian. 
                                                 
4 Douglas L. Bland, “Unified Theory of Civil Military Relations”. Armed Forces & Society, Vol 26, 
No1, Fall11999 p.9 
5 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique; the Question of Civil Control”. ARMED 
FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol.23 Winter 1996 p. 149 & 160 
5 
(ii) The military establishment must be embedded within the government 
system. 
(iii) The military establishment must be embedded within the society. 
(iv) The military establishment must be embedded within the economy. 
(v) A unified military command must exist for the Services.6  
The Constitution of 1992 covered most of the proposals by Henry Gaffney Jr. and 
the opinions of experts in the field of civil military relations. Nevertheless, reviewing 
some aspects of the Constitution is suggested to ensure democratic consolidation and 
effective civilian control of the military. 
Herbert M. Howe identifies the rulers' trepidation about loyalty as prompting the 
creation of parallel security forces, usually ethnically based, as counter-weights to the 
established armed forces.7 These forces only protect the ruler and the regime rather than 
defending the nation, which is one major source of instability in civil military relations. 
The creation of the Presidents Own Guard Regiment in Ghana was one of the reasons for 
the overthrow of Dr Nkrumah’s government in the first republic.  
There are three levels of analysis in civil military relations: the systemic 
(structure); the state, made up of bureaucracy, leaderships, and legislature; and finally the 
societal groups. Ghana, as a democratic nation state, is part of the international political 
economy giving weight to its systemic level while influencing the societal levels. The 
state is situated in both the domestic and international realm, so any weakening in civil 
military relations automatically affects the domestic as well as the international arena.  
The impact on the domestic level is, however, greater but, a realist would assume the 
state as a rational unitary actor, which responds to only external threats. 
The end of the Cold War and its related strategic events have caused the Western 
industrialized countries to adopt the promotion of democracy and ensuring a sound and 
open market economy throughout the world.  The policy of globalization has some effect 
                                                 
6 Henry H. Gaffney Jr, Why Should Civilians Control the Military and How Should They Do it. Center 
for Naval Analyses, Virginia. Professional Paper # 538 / June 1996 p.4 
7 Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous Order Military Forces in African States.(Lynne Rienner Publishers 
London 2001) p.44 
6 
on international civil military relations in the sense that countries, which had big military 
industrial complexes, cannot export as much as before. Ghana and most of the Third 
World countries now consolidating their democracy cannot buy as much military 
equipment as before because of objective civilian control of the military.  The Western 
industrialized world’s promotion of international democratization is a very good 
initiative; nonetheless, its impact on civil-military relations could result in serious 
consequences for some of the new democracies because the military will not obtain what 
it wants. 
The theme of this thesis is “Preventing military intervention in West Africa: A 
case study of Ghana.” The study is important because Ghana, like any of the countries in 
the West African sub-region, has experienced a lot of coups since its independence in 
1957. All attempts at effective democratic rule have failed in Ghana and in most of West 
Africa since the military has been indirectly involved in the political system of the 
countries from the pre-colonial period until today. In addition some leaders have 
interfered in the military structures and institutions to such an extent that the military 
always feels threatened. The military played an important part in the pre-colonial period 
in the building of a very powerful Ashanti Empire, south of the Sahara, in what is now 
called Ghana. The colonial era military was gainfully involved in the struggle for 
independence from the British. On February 28, 1947, a group of ex-servicemen, who 
fought on the side of the British in India during the Second World War, obtained 
permission to hold a parade demonstrating their grievance against the government at 
Christiansburg Castle;8 Unfortunately, these demonstrations turned into social 
disturbances which resulted in the death of some of the ex-servicemen. It further 
degenerated into riots, looting, and breaking into jails in Accra. The people had become 
disenchanted with the government's policies and its inability to lower prices. This action 
by the ex-servicemen together with those of the general population triggered agitation for 
independence.   
                                                 
8 F. K. Mensah, Government and Constitutional Developments in Ghana (Heidelberg: University of 
Heidelberg, 1976) p.75 And Adu Boahen, Ghana Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (London. Longman Group 1975) p.163. It must be noted that the boycott and other measures took 
effect before Nkrumah became well known. The riots later extended to other cities in the country. 
7 
The primary concern for the country is achieving civilian control of the military 
and making a democracy work during this fourth attempt at constitutional rule. A good 
relationship between the intelligence apparatus, the executive branch, the military as well 
as the population is of prime importance in consolidating democracy.  This will build 
confidence and reduce hatred and suspicion that exist between the institutions. Failure to 
achieve this undermined previous attempts at effective democratic rule in Ghana, and in 
most of West Africa.9  
The colonial master, Britain, established the military in Ghana to protect and 
defend the territorial integrity of the nation but also maintain order in the smooth 
functioning of the colony by engaging in police duties, suppressing internal unrest and 
rebellions. As a result, the military found itself either directly or indirectly involved in the 
governance of the nation. Government upon government further shifted the military from 
its assigned roles to a role in politics. 
Ghana did not have a well-equipped and effective police force to handle internal 
civil disorder and other police duties, and the government did not attempt to equip the 
police either. This resulted in deploying the military from time to time in civil affairs. By 
doing this, the military became directly involved in political process. This situation 
existed because civilians required the military to consolidate their hold on power. Noting 
this, and thinking that they had the ability to rule better, the military moved to eliminate 
civilian government through coup d’etat. However, they found that they could not govern 
without the expertise of the civilians. The lack of expertise led the military to turn to the 
same civilians, which it had previously removed from power.  
Ghana has no clear separation between defense intelligence and the national 
intelligence agencies. This situation has always resulted in the military doubling in other 
intelligence matters that have no direct bearing on the military and has always been a 
threat to consolidating democracy. Government upon governments have always 
oppressed their opponents and their activities under the cover of national security, which 
                                                 
9  There have been coups in almost all of the countries in the West African Sub-region. Nigeria has had 
as many coups like Ghana where as countries like Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Mali, and the Gambia have had at least one or two coups to their credit. Godfrey Mwakikagile (2001) has 
written extensively about this in Military Coups in West Africa Since the Sixties. 
8 
has been a source of hatred and rivalry amongst political parties; in most cases, the 
military is dragged into it through the Defense intelligence outfit.   
 
C.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
In trying to arrive at a framework for the effective control of the military by the 
civilian authority, a brief background of the military institution ties its involvement to 
politics. Two questions arise in establishing this study: 
(i) Why has the military in Ghana been involved in politics? 
(ii) What role can the military play in the consolidation of democracy 
while, at the same time, being under effective civilian control? 
(iii) Attempting to answer these questions also creates some more issues 
that will be addressed in the subsequent chapters; however, some of 
these need to be highlighted now: 
(iv) Parliamentary oversight and executive control. 
(v) Transparence and accountability of budget and procurement processes 
of the military. 
(vi) The management of transitioning from involvement in politics to the 
traditional roles. 
(vii) The military's impression of its subordination to civilian authority. 
(viii) Separation of defense intelligence from national security issues while 
cooperating with each other. 
 
D.  RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The research is a historical case study covering primary research based on 
interviews with policymakers and senior military officers in Ghana. In my analysis, I 
used textbooks, and the electronic resources at the Naval Postgraduate School (Internet 
and Lexis Nexis, etc.). I also made use of reports in newspapers and other relevant 
journals on Ghana’s democratic processes. 
9 
This research was, however, constrained in the area of intelligence because no 
books were available on Ghana’s intelligence process and interviews conducted on the 
civilian aspect of intelligence processes, gave little information/direction.  Documents 
were, however, made available on the laws that govern intelligence processes in Ghana 
and their function. 
Notwithstanding the constraints in the area of national security, I believe that 
cases studies of specific intelligence events in Ghana alongside the laws that are in place 
will help in establishing how the civilian intelligence organizations functions. To further 
buttress my understanding of the intelligence process, I incorporate some primary 
research findings through an interview with Brigadier General Adu-Amanfo, Director 
General Defense Intelligence. In addition, I interviewed other staff of lesser profile at the 
office of the Director National Security. All interviews were conducted in December 
2001. 
Chapter II discusses the history of military involvement in the political system in 
Ghana, analyzing the coups of 1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981 and, finally, the national 
intelligence institutions and the military. Chapter III analyzes the form of civilian control 
of the military currently in existence by studying the relationship between the executive 
branch, Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the military, on one side, and the legislature and 
the military, on the other. It further examines the institutional mechanisms that the 
Constitutions has in place to guide these relationships, identifies potential weaknesses 
and makes recommendations for strengthening the framework for objective civilian 
control of the military under a democratic system. Finally, an effective national security 
and intelligence system will be discussed for the purpose of ensuring secrecy while, at the 
same time, maintaining transparency under the democratic process. Chapter IV will 
summarize all the chapters and come up with a proposed framework as a guide for 




II.  MILITARY AND POLITICS IN GHANA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The involvement of the military in politics goes back to the period of the Ashanti 
Empire in the 1700, when the Ashanitis used their military might extensively to expand 
their kingdom to Côte d'Ivoire, the North, and the coastal lands. This was followed by the 
colonial period when the British used the military extensively in the World Wars while 
also relying on the military to maintain order in their colonies. The military during that 
period was engaged in police duties, and suppression of internal unrest and rebellions in 
the colonies. Due to the poor economic performance of the various post colonial 
governments and their desire to remain in power, the government always involved the 
military in their search for compliance. The politicians have continuously manipulated 
the military institutions resulting in coups, in which the military, dependent on the same 
civilians to govern failed equally to govern effectively or manage the economy 
efficiently. 
This chapter will attempt to show military civilian interdependency and 
interpenetration in all the forms of governments that Ghana has had and to establish how 
this interferes with military institutions and structures undermines objective civil-military 
relations. The chapter will also study the specific role of intelligence institutions showing 
how they have operated as an important channel for military civilian interpenetration.    
 
B. BACKGROUND OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS 
The military in Ghana has been involved in politics since the time of the pre-
colonial period when Ghana was referred to as the Gold Coast. The Ashanti Empire, 
which forms part of the present day Ghana, emerged around 1700 principally by waging 
wars of conquest against other states. By 1824, the empire had expanded to cover most of 
present day Ghana and parts of the Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo. Even though 
some of the other states still existed under their own leaders, they paid tribute to the 
11 
Ashantehene who was the head of the Ashanti Empire.10 The military’s role in holding 
this empire together cannot be over emphasized.  
The Ashanti Empire made use of the military in its effort to expand. The military 
was used in the conquests of other states usually producing large numbers of captives and 
domestic servants used by their conquerors to perform certain activities, such as farming, 
mining, housework and to fight in the military. The military, in many ways, helped the 
Ashanti Kingdom to build a very vibrant economy before the coming of the British to the 
Gold Coast.  Trading already existed between the Ashanti and the Portuguese in 1471. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, Ashanti was a highly organized state with a very 
powerful military, which facilitated the expansion of the kingdom to the northern states 
of Mamprusi, Dagomba and Gonja. Wherever they conquered, the territories forcibly 
consolidated into the confederation; nonetheless, the territories were allowed to retain 
their own customs and chiefs, who were given seats on the Ashanti State Council. The 
military’s duty was to work out a system to ensure that the conquered states stayed loyal 
to the Ashanti Kingdom, and, in response, the military had to recruit some of its 
personnel from the conquered territories. 
The Europeans noticing the volume of trade that was taking place between the 
Ashanti Empire and Europe, fought each other for control of the kingdom, which later 
became part of the Gold Coast. After the British finally won over the other Europeans, 
they decided to conquer the whole Ashanti Kingdom together with the coastal lands and 
to make it a colony. The Ashanti State and merchants regarded the British attempt to 
control the Gold Coast as illegitimate resulting in political tension between the State and 
the British. The first governor of the Gold Coast, George Maclean succeeded in signing 
numerous treaties with the Ashanti State, but the prospects of war still persisted.11  
The control of the gold mines was the main concern of the British resulting 
eventually in a series of battles between the Ashanti State and the British. In one of the 
battles, (Insamankon in 1824), the British were humiliated and the Governor of Sierra 
                                                 
10 Edward Reynolds, Trade and Economic Changes in the Gold Coast 1807-1874. (Longman Group, 
London 1974)  p.5 
 
11 Ibid., p. 117 
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Leone, Sir Charles MacCarthy was killed. The Ashantis were later defeated by the British 
in the battle of Dodowah in 1826; thereafter the British established a colony in the Gold 
Coast bringing together the coastal lands and the whole Ashanti State. 
The British used the military force that existed in the Gold Coast and the rest of 
the West African colonies to form the nucleus of the Royal West African Frontier Force 
(RWAFF). As far back as 1898, the Gold Coast provided a quota of the RWAFF, used 
extensively in the World Wars and the control of the colonial states in the region. This 
was a para-military unit made up of soldiers from British West Africa (Sierra Leone, the 
Gambia, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast). This unit was the coercive arm of the colonial 
state and would be ready to support imperial defense objectives.12 The military in the 
Gold Coast, therefore, became involved in politics right from the point of colonialization. 
This happened because the British relied on the military of the then British West Africa 
to defeat the Ashanti.  The military was always called upon by the British to maintain 
order in the colony by engaging in police duties, and suppressing internal unrest and 
rebellions.  
The military carried out these functions throughout the period of colonialism in 
most of the West African states. The British again attempted to increasingly politicize the 
RWAFF in the World Wars precisely for reasons that it was engaged in the fighting. The 
RWAFF served in the WWI on the side of the British against the Germans and in WWII 
with British against the Japanese army in the Far East.13 The military, therefore, found 
itself as part of the political system.  Since the military is the manager of violence, in any 
governmental apparatus, they decided to evoke power on themselves to ensure good 
governance and accountability, which has always failed.  
Notably, during the colonial period the top ranks of the military were dominated 
by British officers. Due to this dominance, the officer corps of the Ghana Armed Forces 
had very few Ghanaians at independence in 1957 with the military being mostly under 
British command. There were 200 British officers and 25 Ghanaian junior officers when  
                                                 
12 E. Lefever, Spear and Specter; Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa (Washington D.C. The 
Brookings Institution 1970) p.37. The role of the Military in Ghana is well-documented in Hutchful, 
Military Intervention and the Politics of Demilitarization in Ghana 1966-1969. 
13 WWII battles that are still talked about this day by the Ghana Armed Forces. Names like 
“Myohaung”, “Burma” and “Rangoon” have been taken by military.  
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Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) led Ghana into 
independence.14  
C.  THE COUP OF 1966 
 Nkrumah ruled Ghana from its independence in 1957 until February 24,1966, 
when he was overthrown by a military coup. Just three years after Ghana became a 
republic in 1960, Nkrumah sought the backing of the Parliament, where he had a majority 
vote, to transform the country from a multi-party democracy to a one-party state. During 
his rule, the military forces were slowly modified to reflect the changing political 
realities, which, in most cases, was not easy. The changes in policies and politics by 
Nkrumah always resulted in tension between his Government and the Armed Forces.15  
The military felt the Commander-in-Chief, Nkrumah, was threatening its 
independence setting the military on a collision course with him. Nkrumah, realizing that 
the military was not too happy with his interference, dismissed all 80 top British Officers 
including the Army Commander Major General Alexander, and replaced them with the 
Ghanaian officers. 16 The independence of the authority of the military was further 
eroded when a special military force, the President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), was 
formed as a parallel force and placed directly under his office. This parallel force was to 
protect Nkrumah and his regime from all threats, including the Ghana Armed Forces.  
Even though this force was better paid and equipped, it was far too small to defend the 
nation.   
The coup of 1966 occurred as a result of the interference of the government in 
military activities. Most Ghanaian officers before the coup were either trained in Great 
Britain or trained in Ghana by a British training team. The President’s personal security 
                                                 
14 W. Cutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1965) p. 100.  
15 One of these was the military’s misinterpretation of Nkrumah’s relationship with Patrice Lumumba. 
The military was unhappy about the possibility of being sent to fight against UN forces, which were 
considered allies. This was at the height of the Cold War, and the situation there was highly charged. (Bob 
Fitch & Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion. Published by Monthly Review Press New York 
1966).                                                                                                                                                                                                
16 W. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics. (London: Metheum & Co., Ltd. 1969) p. 103. See 
also Ghana: Recurrence and Change in a Post-Independence African State (Peter Lang.: New York 1999) 
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force was, however, trained in the Soviet Union. A few of the officers, however, 
benefited from military training assistance from the United States and Canada. The 
Ghanaian officers trained by the British tended to judge their African experience by the 
norms of British society and values in the British officer corps. One of the coup leaders, 
General A.A. Afrifa, who was then a colonel, in an interview after the coup with the 
London Observer of March 13, explained why the Ghanaian officers did not like the 
Nkrumah regime:  
We’ve lived in Britain before, and therefore, didn’t like this dictatorship. 
There was no freedom of the press or of the individual- things we know 
are fundamental human rights. Nkrumah introduced party politics into the 
army. He took a man with no training as an officer, Mr. Hassan, appointed 
him a brigadier general and put him in charge of military intelligence. 
Hence we had a situation in which mess corporals were watching 
commanding officers and reporting them. What greater insult to our 
intelligence and patriotism.   
 In another quarter, the belief is that Nkrumah caused a lot of dissatisfaction in the 
military by considering the members of his POGR as being better trained and more loyal 
to him.  The President did not respect the expertise of the military and, therefore, never 
asked for professional advice. For example, during the United Nation (UN) Congo 
intervention in 1961, Ghana provided a contingent under the command of British Major- 
General H.T. Alexander and Colonel Ankrah, a Ghanaian, as his second in command. 
Both of these officers opposed Dr. Nkrumah’s policy towards the Lumumba forces in 
Congo. He put his troops under UN command but maintained his longstanding support 
for Congolese President Lumumba by sending weapons secretly to the Lumumbaists. The 
two officers in charge of the Ghanaian contingent opposed this action which they saw as 
undermining the UN mission and interfering with the conduct of the operation.17 This 
opposition causing Nkrumah to think that the British were out to sabotage him, and led 
him to relieve General H.T. Alexander of his command and replaced him with his second 
in command,  The military found itself ideologically opposed to the government, making 
it very difficult for it to see itself as the defender of the country. As the government 
continued to establish itself both at home and abroad, the military felt more alienated 
                                                 
17 Robert Fitch & Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion (Publish by Monthly Review Press 
New York, 1968). p. 5  
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from the government and took steps to safeguard its interests and institutions by planning 
to overthrow that government.  
All the achievements of Ghana were also credited to the African continent.18 
Therefore, when Ghana took on Pan-African militancy and support for liberation 
movements as well as the anti-neo-colonialism posture in 1965, the western world 
naturally felt threatened.19 Some believed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) played a role in the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah.20  Whether or not this was the 
case, external forces feeling threatened by Ghana’s lead in anti-capitalist, the anti-
colonial struggle and its Pan-Africanist posture saw the military as a welcomed ally. 
On the domestic front, Nkrumah believed that rapid modernization of industry 
and communications was necessary and achievable if the workforce was completely 
Africanized and educated. In contrast, the political opposition and the economic elites in 
the country felt these things must be accomplished at a pace that the economy could 
handle. Nkrumah set about to achieve these goals by introducing the preventive detention 
Acts of 1958, 1959 and 1962 to eliminate the elite and traditional chiefs in the opposition 
camp who might hinder his progress towards achieving a one-party state and a socialist 
economic posture.   
Nkrumah’s drive towards Pan-Africanist adventures created new sources of 
opposition domestically with the presentation in July 1961 of the country’s first austerity 
budget, which brought workers and farmers face to face with the cost of Nkrumah’s 
programs. Their reaction set the model for protests over taxes and benefits that have 
dominated Ghanaian political crises ever since. The population at this point started losing 
faith in Nkrumah’s government and this became another opening for the coup of 1966. 
                                                 
18 Ghana was the first Black African country to emerge from colonial rule after independence from 
Britain in 1957 and before independence she was one of the most politically advanced African colonies. 
Ghana again projected itself among the Black nations of the world when it produced the first Black 
president of the United Nations General Assembly. Alex Quaison-Sackey who was the Foreign Affairs 
Minister under Dr. Nkrumah’s government was elected the president of the UN General Assembly on 
December 1, 1964.  
19 This was in the heat of the Cold War. It was felt that any move by Ghana could course a big swing 
in the Africa South of the Sahara towards communism. 
20 According to the testimony given to Senator Frank Church, chairman of the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during a congressional hearing in 1975,  he focused on the CIA’s illegal activities, 
which included assassination of foreign leaders. See also Godfrey Mwakikugile, Military Coups in West 
Africa Since the Sixties (Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Huntington NY 2001) p. 39 
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The coup of February 24,1966 was led by the military and the police. A ruling 
council made up of senior military and police officers assumed the executive branch and 
the legislative power through the National Liberation Council (NLC). The NLC started to 
roll back the socialist polices of the CPP government by liberating the economy from the 
clutches of the state. It drew up proposals intended to promote more social development. 
Perhaps the most far-reaching policy direction of the NLC was introducing Ghana’s 
economy to outside influence. This became very important because, by 1966, the state 
had become the predominant player in the economy of Ghana. 
The NLC adopted a privatization program to ensure the general development of 
the country and also chose individuals whose objectives and interests were different from 
the previous government’s stated aims. The thrust of the NLC’s economic policies was to 
move in the direction of undoing and dismantling a state- dominated economy, which 
despite its drawbacks had the potential to be more self-sustaining.21 However, the                               
military’s inexperience in governance soon resulted in the NLC approving whatever 
recommendations were put before it by the same civil service that had worked under 
Nkrumah. Public outcry on the increasing powers of the bureaucracy led to the 
appointment of commissioners to head government departments in the late 1966. This 
change did not affect the substance of the policies, but only replaced top civil servants 
with purely political appointees who were outside the service. As it became increasingly 
difficult for them to run the country, the military and the police created two policy-
making advisory bodies, the Economic Advisory Committee (EAC) and the Political 
Advisory Committee (PAC). The EAC became very powerful because of the priority 
accorded the economy by the NLC. The EAC was charged with attracting foreign capital, 
restoring economic relations with the West and stabilizing the budget process.22 All six 
members of the committee were senior civil servants who had been opposed to 
Nkrumah’s economic policies, and favored orthodox economic policies as advocated by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
                                                 
21 The immediate effects of these policies of the NLC on wage and salary earners were the massive 
retrenchment and rising cost of living that followed. For as part of the usual IMF/World Bank prescription 
for deflating the economies. The public sector demand for labor was so drastically cut that by 1967 about 
60,000 unemployed people had been returned to the labor market. (Observation by K. Ninsin) 
22 Robert Dowse, Military and Police Rule (in Austin and Luckham, ed., Politicians and Soldiers.  
New York Holmes & Merier Publishers 1976). p. 22. 
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The second advisory committee, PAC, was made up of politicians who had 
opposed Nkrumah before and after independence. This group, before the coup, had no 
chance to operate as a political party due to the declaration of Ghana as one party state. 
Clashes and disagreements took place between the EAC and PAC making it very difficult 
for the NLC to rule. Nevertheless, the military remained solidly behind the NLC. It was, 
therefore, no surprising that the national defense budget doubled from 24.4 million new 
cedis in 1965 to 54.2 million new cedis in 1966.23  
The general population and the workers of Ghana initially gave their support to 
the military because they had borne the brunt of the economic downturn in the country 
before the coup. The military included the workers' leadership in the PAC, but the 
economic policies forced on the country by the IMF ostensibly to revive the economy 
made it very difficult for the military to meet workers' demands. The most injurious was 
the IMF-inspired retrenchment policy, laying off many workers. Another IMF-inspired 
policy was the devaluation of the currency, which resulted in very high inflation and high 
prices of goods. This finally resulted in civil unrest and the military's unpopular position 
with civilian population. There was labor unrest and strike actions by workers which 
further crippled the failing economy.24  
The NLC soon found itself under intense criticism from all sections of Ghanaian 
society. Predictably, a group of young officer attempted to overthrow the NLC in April 
1967, and General Kotoka, one of the architects of the 1966 coup, was killed. Feeling so 
pressured from all sides, the NLC made plans to hand over to those politicians, mostly in 
PAC, who had since the advent of the coup in 1966 been hoping to take power. Elections 
were organized to turn the country over to a multi-party regime. Most of the politicians in 
the PAC came together to form the Progress Party (PP), which won the elections in 
October 1969 and became the new Government of Ghana. Since the EAC members 
                                                 
23 Immediately after the coup, bonus payments were made to all officers and men as a reward for their 
services in supporting the coup. Akwasi P. Osei, Ghana. Recurrence and Change in a Post- Independence 
African State(Peter Lang New York 1999) p. 83. See also Ocran, A Myth Is Broken, The personal account 
of the coup. And Afrifa, The Ghana Coup are full of Military Grievances. 
24 In January 1967, 5,000 workers at the largest gold mines in Ghana - the Obuasi gold-fields - went 
on strike; this was followed by another strike action by railway employees at Sekondi/Takoradi that 
resulted in stoppage by 2000 workers at the Port. The strike action continued and within the three years of 
the NLC’s rule there were over 100 strike actions.  
18 
continued in their senior civil servants positions, policy making lost neither step nor 
orientation during the transition from the NLC to the PP regime.   
Evidently, politicians who were opposed to Nkrumah and had no way of taking 
power away from him had to work their way to power through the military. The military 
got international support for the coup because it was able to put a halt to the Pan-
Africanist and anti-neo-colonialist posture of the Nkrumah’s government, which was 
seen as a threat to the region by the West due to the involvement of the Soviet Union.25  
The participation of the ex-politicians in the PAC made the military feel as though the 
civilians had accepted them into the political system of Ghana. The lesson learned was a 
dangerous one: as the managers of violence, the military concluded that it had to set aside 
the Constitution and intervene when it felt that its interest and those of the nation were 
not being taken care of by the ruling government.  
 
D.  THE COUP OF 1972 
Following the election of October 1969, the Progress Party (PP) became the 
government of Ghana under the leadership of Dr. K. A. Busia, who became the Prime 
Minister and was the head of both the PAC and the Center for Civic Education (NLC’s 
most visible political institution). Most of the members of PAC carried on with the same 
appointments they held under the NLC, so in effect, it was only the ruling government 
that changed and not the policy direction.24 As a result, the economic situation in Ghana 
did not change but continued to be bleak with serious balance of payment problems, high 
unemployment, high prices of goods and shortages of needed commodities.  
The PP could not deliver its rural development promise made during the election 
campaign because of the continuous drop in cocoa prices worldwide (Cocoa is the major 
foreign exchange generator for Ghana). The situation of the economy became so bad that 
the PP government had to devalue the Ghanaian currency by 44 percent vis-à-vis the US 
                                                 
25 This was at the height of the Cold War and the West would support any action, which in their 
interest would stop the spread of Communism or Soviet influence in the world. 
 
24 For example the Attorney General under the NLC, Victor Owusu, assumed the same position in 
Busia’s cabinet. See also Akwasi P. Osei, Ghana: Recurrence and Change in a Post-Independence African 
State. (Peter Lang Publishing New York 1999) p. 84 
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dollar. This move greatly devastated all sections of the economy overnight. This 
devaluation hit the average worker so hard that in 1969 alone the government recorded 51 
strikes in which 28,000 workers participated. In 1970 the number of strikes by workers 
had risen to 55. These strikes demonstrated the workers' displeasure with the 
Government's policies and made the Government very unstable. Workers at this point 
joined up with other oppressed groups such as the National Union of Ghana Students 
(NUGS) to oppose government policies.  
During this period, the military remained in the barracks and did not interfere with 
what was going on between the workers and the government. The Prime Minister, 
however, feeling his government was threatened, resorted to the same measures that had 
led to Nkrumah’s down fall. First he banned the Trades Union Congress (TUC), the 
official labor movement,25 and all workers union activities. Second, as the CPP did, the 
PP in an arrogant misuse of State power, dismissed over 500 civil servants even after the 
Supreme Court had ordered a halt to it. Third, as the CPP had done, the PP regime set 
aside the ruling of the Supreme Court in one case of a dismissed civil servant by refusing 
to reinstate him. Fourth, the PP regime sought to control the military, which had been 
calm during all this period, by dismissing some unsympathetic senior officers just like the 
CPP had. Fifth, the PP regime prevented its political opponents from gaining any political 
foothold and attempted to crush them by promulgating a law that banned all direct and 
indirect mention of Nkrumah and the CPP, just like what the CPP had done to its 
opposition.  
Dr. Busia’s government alienated itself from its support base to the point that the 
favored members of the government's support base began to turn against its policies. An 
example was the National Chamber of Commerce, which supported the government’s 
laissez-faire economic policies, but later came out strongly against those same policies.26 
The government was again alienated in its foreign policy when it called for “dialogue” 
with the illegal apartheid regime in South Africa, after Ghana had joined the rest of 
Africa in calling for a liberation struggle.  
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Publishers Accra Ghana 1987).  p. 44 & 45. 
26 Akwasi P. Osei, p. 86 
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The final action by Busia, which pulled the military back into politics was his 
attempt to preempt a possible coup d'état by rearranging the military command structure, 
putting officers sympathetic to his party in sensitive positions. General Ocran, one of the 
ruling members of the NLC, made an interesting observation that “in Africa a contented 
army, however small, is the pillar of security and economic growth."27 As long as the 
military is not happy with government policies that affect its established institutions, any 
effort at stability and economic well-being would be seriously undermined. The military 
in Ghana has proven to be a lightning rod for political upheaval at times of 
socioeconomic decline. However, in almost all the interventions, the military has failed to 
live up to expectations. 
Colonel I.K. Acheampong led the coup of January 13, 1972, which overthrew Dr. 
K.A. Busia and sought to create a truly military government, National Redemption 
Council (NRC), unlike that of the NLC. The Council was reorganized into the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC) the same year with its membership restricted to all the service 
commanders and some senior military officers. In Colonel I.K. Acheampong’s maiden 
broadcast he said the military had moved in to restore its eroding material benefits and 
also to protect the “few amenities” that they had left, which the Busia Government was 
taking away.28 In 1966, the military felt Nkrumah was meddling in its affairs by 
dismissing officers, and forming a para-military Presidential guard. In 1972 the military 
again felt the Busia Administration was interfering by shifting commanders, promoting 
sympathizers, meddling in their affairs and cutting the military budget.  
 
E.   THE COUPS OF 1979 AND 1981 
The intent of creating a purely military government by the SMC was to 
consolidate the military’s hold over the government administration. This objective was 
not met. The military, still lacking the expertise to run a government successfully, had to 
call on the same senior civil servants for advice and also to lead the way in administering 
the government ministries and establishments. Even though senior military officers were 
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appointed to head various ministries as commissioners, this did not cause any serious 
change in the policy direction economically or politically. The inclusion of the service 
commanders as members of the ruling body (SMC) was intended to maintain effective 
power by transferring military hierarchy into the political realm. However, the officer 
Corp became more interested in politics and gave very little attention to their role as 
military leaders. This caused a lot of dissatisfaction in the rank and file of the military, 
which affected discipline, morale and professionalism. 
In 1977 the SMC, in a bid to solidify its hold on power, proposed the formation of 
a union government (UNIGOV) but this was strongly opposed by all sections of the 
population, especially from the petit bourgeois, national intelligentsia and students. The 
SMC went ahead and organized a referendum on the UNIGOV but the opposition 
organized the population against the referendum, and it was rejected. The opposition later 
organized rallies and meetings against the SMC but the council replied with the force of 
the military, resulting in many deaths in Kumasi (the second largest city in Ghana) on 
February 4, 1978.29 At the same time the government was facing opposition from within 
the country, falling export prices on the world market were creating serious balance of 
payment deficits, further lowering the morale of both workers and farmers. The resultant 
strike action by workers and professionals to forced the government to resign. For the 
first time in the history of Ghana civil servants went on strike.  Between August and 
November 1978 alone, there were eighty strikes. 
The SMC attempted to make some changes in its own structure by forcing the 
leader and Head of State, General Acheampong, to resign as member of the Government. 
The other generals sacrificed their leader, accusing him of running a “one-man show” but 
this did not stop the desire and the will of the population to return to a multi-party rule. 
Strikes continued throughout the year attracting groups like doctors, engineers, nurses, 
teachers, sanitation workers, civil servants, university lecturers and students. The SMC 
ended up creating a united opposition front, which found expression in groups such as the 
People’s Movement for Freedom and Justice (PFMJ), and the Front for the Prevention of 
Dictatorship (FPD). The objective of the civil disobedience was to remove the SMC 
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regime from power, and again the strike actions were met with swift repression by the 
military and the police. During these periods the junior ranks of the military felt that the 
crises affecting the nation were brought on by actions of the military hierarchy in power 
and not just one man. On May 15, 1979, a junior Air Force officer, Flight Lieutenant 
Jerry Rawlings, attempted a coup d'état with a few other soldiers.  
At the court martial, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings articulated his frustration with 
the neglected section of the military, the junior officers and the ranks. These frustrations 
were the same for the average worker. On June 4, 1979 he was released from jail during 
an uprising (mutiny) by some soldiers, which later succeeded in overthrowing the SMC 
regime. The clash was quite bloody between the rank and file of the military and their 
senior officers, resulting in a number of deaths. The Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) made up of junior officers and ranks was formed as the new ruling 
body. For the first-time junior officers and the ranks tasted political power, and like the 
senior officers before them, developed the will do it again when the chance comes.   
The first thing the AFRC did was to try all the SMC members and execute them 
with General Acheanpong who had been sacked by then. The major aim of the AFRC 
was to carry out a “house-cleaning” exercise removing corruption, which had gone into 
the roots of the Ghanaian society, by setting up special courts to try people for corruption 
and other vices. Beyond that, the AFRC stuck to the plan of the SMC and handed over 
power to civilians after multi-party elections three months after taking office. 
The People’s National Party (PNP) won the elections and its leader, Dr. Hilla 
Limann, became the President of the third Republic in December 1979. Dr. Limann’s 
government did not succeed in rejuvenating the economy. It deteriorated rather rapidly in 
1980-81, partly because of crop failure, the poor economy, the introduction of press 
censorship and widespread corruption, which led to discontent with Limann’s 
administration. The junior officers and ranks that had tasted political power for a short 
time felt they made a mistake in handing over power and, therefore, had to come back 
and “save” the country. So on December 31, 1981, Rawlings overthrew Dr. Limann’s 
government declaring that it had brought Ghana total economic ruin. He suspended the 
Constitution of Ghana and appointed a seven-man military and civilian council to help 
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him rule. This coup failed to receive the same popular support that the previous one 
received from the Ghanaian population. A number of Ghanaians were killed during the 
coup and many more fled to neighboring countries. Limann and about 200 officials of his 
government were imprisoned.30  
The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government did not receive 
much support from outside Ghana, forcing the regime to turn to Libya for support 
through reestablishing diplomatic relations with it. Libya reciprocated with financial and 
food aid to the PNDC Government. The Soviet-bloc also sent economic help. The 
Government called on the same civil servants, and some old, and up-and-coming 
politicians to help rebuild the country, but the deteriorating economic condition persisted. 
The PNDC drew a lot of criticism from the student movement that remained the strongest 
opposition to military rule. The Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the student movement 
repeatedly demanded the resignation of the ruling PNDC.  
During the period 1983 to 1992 a number of coup attempts were made but the 
Government survived it all. To revive the failing economy the government adopted 
economic recovery measures as proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. Ghana’s economic performance became so impressive in the late 1980’s 
that it was cited as a model of excellence for other African countries to follow. Even the 
United States, which was not friendly with the PNDC regime acknowledged this when 
Herman J. Cohen, the United State Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated 
in 1989. 
All of the US development assistance money for Africa, which is about 
$550 million and will be the same next year, is concentrated in those 
countries, which are making the greatest effort (to reform their 
economies). So, if you look down to list of countries that are making the 
greatest effort, you’ll see the U.S.’s biggest allocation of funds. And this 
includes countries, which are not necessarily friendly to the United States, 
like for example, Ghana. We’ve had big differences with Ghana over the 
years, but since they are the best performing country, it shows our highest 
priority is in rewarding countries.31 
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 The success of the economic environment was, however, not felt at home. 
Austerity measures left workers and the urban poor as dissatisfied as ever. International 
and domestic pressures forced the PNDC to embrace democratic rule as a means of 
getting more investments and, also, conforming to the requirements of the time. The 
fourth Republic was born with the election of Jerry John Rawlings as President in 
December 1992. 
 
F.  THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
Intelligence has played major roles in all the regimes and political institutions that 
have characterized the administrations of Ghana since independence. Government upon 
government used the nations intelligence apparatus to suppress opponents and instill fear 
in the general populace. In addition, almost every government misused military 
intelligence seeing it as a useful vehicle for preventing coups and maintaining firm 
control of the military. The Gold Coast did not have any intelligence outfit in the colonial 
period. This resulted in the Government not being aware of the political disturbance of 
1948 before it occurred. In response, the Special Branch of the police was established as 
the intelligence and security branch of the police in Ghana by the colonial Government. 
After independence, however, Nkrumah’s government felt the need to separate the 
Special Branch from the police administration and the Police Chief. This ensured that 
political intelligence necessary for the security and governance of the nation did not go 
through the Chief of Police before reaching the office of the President. The National 
Security Council came directly under the President and the Special Branch became an 
agency of that. 
The need to control intelligence became very vital during Nkrumah’s 
administration. He was able to use it against all those who opposed his administration. It 
was also used effectively against the press so that the press only reported what was 
perceived as good in the eyes of his party.33  
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33 An example is when a reporter had spent a week in a paper processing factory it identify the 
problem with production and to write an article on it.  His boss before publishing the article changed a 
Nkrumah had total control of domestic intelligence, but still felt the need to 
control military intelligence in order to stop opponents from gaining some favor in that 
direction. This, I believe, was the main reason why Mr Hassan, a civilian without any 
military knowledge, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier and made Director of Military 
Intelligence. This civilian could not be expected to function properly without politicizing 
the military profession.34 The morale in the service was seriously affected and it marked 
the beginning of the end of Nkrumah’s regime.  
When the NLC administration came into office, J.W.K. Harlley who was the Vice 
Chairman of the Council and Inspector General of Police moved the Special Branch from 
the National Security Council back to the police administration. Military intelligence 
continued to be controlled directly by the leader of the Council. This shows that 
throughout the changing phases of the political system in Ghana, military intelligence 
continued to be under the executive branch.    
Intelligence agencies and their mode of operation have been a source of concern 
for almost every government. Every change of government has resulted in the directors of 
both the Special Branch and the Defense Intelligence being sacked or chased out of 
office. The reason for this is that governments have always manipulated the intelligence 
apparatus and its personnel to suit their needs and also to suppress opposition activities. 
Anytime a coup takes place, one of the groups of people that the coup instigators try to 
hunt down is the intelligence operators and their directors, both in the Special Branch and 
the military intelligence outfits. This has had adverse effect on continuity with respect to 
intelligence gathering and professional efficiency of the operators and analysts.  In some 
cases, this has led to innocent people being arrested and charged with plotting to 
overthrow the Government.  Some examples of these cases are given by Kofi B. 
Quantson in his book, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector.35  
                                                 
whole lot with the view that he cannot write about the government’s incompetence. (Kofi B. Quantson, 
Ghana Peace and Stability A Chapter from the intelligence sector. NAPASCOM LTD Accra 1995) p. 70 to 
72. 
34 Ibid.. Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, p. 5 
35 Kofi B. Quantson, Ghana: Peace and Stability. Chapter From The Intelligence Sector NAPASCOM 
Ltd Accra 2000. p. 216-217. 
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Following the abrasive security surveillance on Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings, 
Captain Kojo Tsikata and some of the ex-members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) that handed over power to Dr. Hilla Limann’s People National Party 
(PNP) experienced subsequent harassment that was both unprofessional and unprofitable. 
It has been clear to all involved that when a regime falls members of the intelligence 
agencies are in for trouble. As a result, the defense intelligence outfit shifted from its 
basic roles and concentrated on counter-coup, and harassment of those not supporting the 
government. Intelligence collection and other activities of the department were sacrificed 
for following opposition politicians. Not surprisingly a systematic disbanding of the 
Defense Intelligence Department and the dismantling of the Special Branch followed the 
1981 coup.  
The Special Branch was reorganized by the PNDC government and renamed 
Bureau of National Investigations (BNI). A few of the old hands were retained, while 
new young men were recruited. Distrust between the old staff and the new staff, who 
found the old staff to be part of the old establishment and, therefore, possibly disloyal to 
the PNDC Government, was a problem. Most of the new staff were recruited from 
students and youth who supported Rawlings two administrations and who saw 
themselves as revolutionary radicals with an unyielding inflexibility towards people they 
did not consider as one of them.36 Another problem that the BNI faced was that most of 
the newly recruited staff were sent to Cuba for training. They came back exhibiting 
ideological radicalism in interpreting the economic policies of the PNDC. This staff 
viewed the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 
imperialist/capitalist institution out to block the progress being made by Ghana and other 
countries. It reached a point where their ideological beliefs were running high above what 
was required of them in performing their duties. This, therefore, made them enemies of 
the general society as well as all those who were opposed to military rule.  
During all this period the military did not have any department for defense 
intelligence, but the individual services continued to have small intelligence cells 
attached to their operations department. The general belief was that any intelligence 
                                                 
36 Ibid. Kofi B. Quantson (2000) p. 213 
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department would invariably be used against the soldiers themselves, finally affecting the 
stability of the nation as a whole and the military in particular. 
 
G.   CONCLUSION 
The military in Ghana has been involved in politics since the time of the pre-
colonial period when Ghana was referred as the Gold Coast. The Ashanti Empire, which 
forms part of the present day Ghana, emerged around 1700 principally by waging wars of 
conquest against other states. The British used the military force that was in existence in 
the Gold Coast and the rest of the West African colonies to form the nucleus of the Royal 
West Africana Frontier Force (RWAFF). As far back as 1898, the Gold Coast provided a 
quota of the RWAFF, which was used extensively in the World Wars and the control of 
the Colonial States in the region. The British relied on the military of the then British 
West Africa to defeat the Ashanti power.  In addition, in the Gold Coast, the military was 
always called upon by the British to preserve order in the colony by engaging in police 
duties, suppressing internal unrest and rebellions. On attaining independence in 1957, 
under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the British 
presence remained in Ghana’s military with 200 British officers as against 25 junior 
Ghanaian officers.  
Dr Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup following his creation of a one- 
party state, run down of Ghana’s economy, interference in the military structures and 
creating a parallel military force, the Presidents Own Guard Regiment (POGR). 
Following the coup of 1966, three more interventions in Ghana have occurred for the 
same reasons: economic mismanagement, suppression of opposition activities, 
interference in military institutions and structures, and disregard for human rights. The 
military in all these interventions have ruled alongside with the same civilians that they 
had overthrown. This has been so because of total lack of expertise on the part of the 
military. The military, having been involved in the first coup, became part of the political 
system.  
Intelligence institutions and apparatus have suffered under all the forms of 
governments that Ghana has had since independence. Governments have always tried to 
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use the intelligence agencies to perpetuate their stay in power. This has led to intelligence 
organizations being perceived by the general population and those in the opposition as a 
threat to their existence. So every change in government has resulted in the intelligence 
apparatus being dismantled or in some of those working in the service being sacked. This 
has always affected the Government's efficiency and professionalism because of its lack 
































































III. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN THE FOURTH 
REPUBLIC 
 A.   INTRODUCTION 
As Ghana prepared to move towards constitutional rule in the late 1980s, a 
consultative assembly was established to draft the new Constitution, which was voted on 
in 1992 and came into effect on January 7, 1993. It provided the basic charter for the 
country’s fourth attempt at republican democratic governance since independence in 
1957. The constitution declared Ghana a unitary republic with sovereignty residing in the 
people. It was written with a view to  preventing future coups, dictatorial governments, 
and one-party states. The Constitution is designed to foster tolerance and power sharing. 
During the document’s drafting, lessons learned from the abrogated constitutions of 
1957, 1960, 1969, and 1979 were incorporated, along with provisions and institutions 
drawn from the British and the United States Constitutions. After three sets of free and 
fair elections since 1992 Ghana can now be said to be consolidating its democracy. Thus 
the chapter identifies areas where the legal framework for civilian control of the military 
could be strengthened to reflect the maturing of Ghana’s democracy.  
The 1992 Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, provides for the 
sharing of power among a President, the Parliament, the Cabinet, the Council of State and 
an independent judiciary. A system of checks and balances was incorporated to avoid 
bestowing absolute power on any specific branch of government. Additional checks and 
balances were established within the executive branch. Executive authority is to be 
shared by the President, the twenty-five member Council of State and the numerous 
advisory bodies including the National Security Council. Neither set of checks and 
balances has entirely worked as expected. The President is head of State, head of 
Government, and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana, and has the 
authority to appoint the Vice President. In drafting the constitutional provision, the 
Rawlings Administration, which was then the government, had an interest in maintaining  
the presidential supremacy during the period of redemocratization. Therefore, the 1992 
Constitution created extensive power in the executive branch. The Constitution created a 
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hybrid of a presidential – parliamentary system in which the President is ultimately 
responsible for determining policy and is vested with the power to appoint more than half 
of the members of State bodies used as a form of oversight control over the executive 
branch. While respecting the authority of the President, care must now be taken to 
balance the executive’s control of the military with some form of oversight mechanism as 
a means of ensuring effective control of the military by the civilian authorities overall. 
This chapter first analyzes the relationships between the executive branch, the 
Ministry of Defense and the military as stipulated in the Constitution and in practice. It 
then proposes some institutional mechanisms to balance the executive branch’s control of 
the military against the structures inherent in the military to ensure its efficiency. These 
mechanisms would also help to make the military more professional and apolitical. The 
chapter further discusses the relationship between the legislature and the military under 
the Constitution with the purpose of identifying shortfalls in the civilian control 
mechanisms, and proposes means by which the legislature can get more involved with 
issues concerning the military, giving it the ability to exercise some form of oversight 
control over the military and the executive branch. Finally the role of intelligence 
agencies and organizations involved in the democratic process in Ghana will be analyzed 
alongside the Security and Intelligence Act of 1996 (Act 526).  Suggestions are made on 
the functioning of the intelligence agencies with the purpose of balancing their activities 
with the requirements of the democratic process while, at the same time, ensuring both 
secrecy and transparency. Lastly, the chapter presents the issue of the military’s 
intelligence apparatus involvement in domestic intelligence activities.  
 
B.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH -MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
The Constitution of Ghana gives the President the power to commit or deploy the 
military, in consultation with the Council of State. Article 50 Section (1) of the 
Constitution of Ghana states “there shall be a President of the Republic of Ghana who 
shall be the Head of State and Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces of Ghana.” The Minister for Defense is, therefore, a representative of the 
32 
President with responsibility over the three services: Army, Navy and Air Force through 
the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The MOD is the ministerial organ in Ghana responsible 
for supervising, coordinating, maintaining the defense machinery and war fighting 
equipment of the Republic of Ghana.  
The Constitution also makes provision for the creation of the National Security 
Council whose members include, in addition to others, the following as stated in the 
article: the Minister for Defense, the Chief of the Defense Staff and two other members 
from the Armed Forces as well as the Director General of Defense Intelligence. The 
President is supposed to make all decisions affecting national security with support from 
the members of the Council.26 
The Council of State is established as a means of ensuring good relations between 
the executive branch and all arms of government, as well as the military. The Council of 
State by its structure, as stated in Article 89 of the Constitution of Ghana, has no power 
or authority over any organ of State, but is designed to be the highest advisory body 
guiding the executive branch in its exercise of control over all arms of Government 
The membership of the Council of State is twenty-five (25). Eleven of the 
members are appointed by the President, and an additional four are selected by him after 
consulting with the Parliament. The ten regions in Ghana each elect a member; however, 
since the President has the majority in the Parliament, this gives him overall control of 
the twenty-five-member council. The present democratic system, in which the President’s 
party has a large majority in the Parliament, facilitates the President in convincing the 
Council on what the military should do, which could draw the military into politics,  
affecting professionalism. Only an unbiased council as the highest advisory body and 
watchdog for the executive branch, can guarantee an apolitical military. It is only then the 
opposition will have confidence in the military as an autonomous institution, which can 
be expected to remain neutral and loyal to the government of the day. While the Council 
of State is to be non-partisan, its composition under Article 89 of the Ghanaian 
Constitution makes it unlikely that it will have no political leverage. Thus, the executive 
                                                 
26 Article 58 (1) of the constitution of Ghana has vested that authority in the president, but this has not 
been so in the past regimes. Presidents have all along acted unilaterally 
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branch can, at any point in time, manipulate the Armed Forces to one side interfering 
with the military structures and institutions.  
Every civilian government since independence violated existing constitutional 
mechanisms to perpetuate its stay in power, while interfering in the military institution. 
All though the 1992 Constitution makes provision for the Council of State and the Armed 
Forces Council to be consulted by the executive branch on matters affecting defense, it 
still allows plenty of opportunity for the executive branch to “highjack” the military for 
its own interest and to eliminate opposition to the incumbent.  This is exactly what 
happened during the rule of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), when the 
opposition was portrayed as hostile to any program that would benefit the military 
institution. 
An amendment is needed to the Article on the organization of the Council of State 
so that executive branch nominations and appointments of members to the Council are 
equal to or less than those being elected from the regions. 27 The President would then 
have to seek consensus for action, and the Ministry of Defense would have the added task 
of educating and informing the legislature as well as the Council of State on behalf of the 
President.  
Article 211 of the constitution of Ghana states that “there shall be established an 
Armed Forces Council which shall consist of   
(i) The vice-president, who shall be chairman.  
(ii) The Ministers responsible for defense, foreign affairs and internal 
affairs.  
(iii) The Chief of Defense Staff, the service chiefs and a senior Warrant 
Officer or its equipment in the Armed Forces, and 
(iv) Two other persons appointed by the President acting in consultation 
with the Council of States…” 
                                                 
27 Article 89 Section (2) a, b, and d of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana makes provision for the 
President to elect and appoint some members of the Council of State. 
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Article 212 also gives power to the President, in consultation with the Armed 
Forces Council, to appoint the Chief of Defense Staff, the Service Chiefs and the officers 
to command positions. Articles 214 states that the Armed Forces Council shall advise the 
president on matters of policy relating to defense and strategy including the role of the 
Armed Forces, military budgeting and finance, administration and the promotion of 
officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or its equivalent. Section B of the same 
article states that “the Armed Forces Council may, with the prior approval of the 
President, by constitution instrument, make regulations for the performance of its 
functions under this constitution or any other law, and for the effective and efficient 
administration of the Armed force.”  
The President appoints the members of the Armed Forces Council including the 
head of the military component. This, to some extent, allows the Armed Forces Council 
to function in the same way as the Council of State because the executive branch can, at 
anytime, influence its decisions and actions. To avoid this and also build the confidence 
of the opposition parties and general population in the military, an amendment has to be 
made to the Constitution’s provisions. The Council should be reconstituted under the 
name Defense Committee with its membership including the original military 
component, the Vice President as Chairman, and the parliamentary sub-committee for 
defense (with fair representation of all parties in the Parliament). 
  
1.   Ministry of Defense (MOD)  
The President also exercises control over the military through the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) headed by a minister of state. For the MOD to function and understand 
the military adequately, the MOD should have some institutions in place to ensure 
efficient and effective use of resources and to offer advice to the President on issues 
requiring action. The MOD is a bureaucracy, which like any bureaucratic institution, 
requires precision, speed and knowledge of the institution's function to ensure efficiency 
and effectiveness. The MOD serves to isolate the military institution from dealing 
directly with the executive branch, thus insulating the military from politics. The MOD 
has been in existence in Ghana since its independence from the British in 1957. It has 
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been the centerpiece in civil –military relations. However, it has not functioned 
adequately and has produced a lack of confidence and suspicion between civilians and 
the military, contributing to military interventions.  
Although functioning reasonably well, the current MOD in Ghana still fails to 
perform all the functions for which MODs are generally established. Professor Thomas 
C. Bruneau, in an article on Ministries of Defense and democratic civil-military relations, 
describes four main tasks that MODs should accomplish for democratic consolidation.28 
Effective objective civilian control of the military in Ghana requires the MOD to fulfill 
these functions. 
The four main tasks before the Minister for Defense in creating the MOD will be 
first, the MOD must be created to structure the power relationship between the 
democratically elected civilians and the Armed Forces. This first task is already in 
existence and working quite well in Ghana. Second, the MOD must allocate 
responsibilities between and among civilians and military officers, providing a fair 
representation of both civilians and military officers with necessary expertise. The MOD 
then becomes a buffer between politics and the Armed Forces. However, this is not yet 
the case with Ghana. The MOD in Ghana has two basic branches, directly under the 
Minister for Defense. These branches are military and civilian, with the military being the 
Chief of Defense Staff, services commanders and the General Headquarters under a Chief 
of Staff. A Chief Director heads the civilian side. All matters in relation to the military, 
which are to receive the attention of the executive branch, are forwarded through the 
Chief of Staff at the General Headquarters to the Chief Director for further submission 
through the Minister to the executive branch. Additionally a direct link exists between the 
Chief of Defense Staff and the Minister without going through the Chief Director. A fair 
representation of both civilians and military officers at the MOD helps the civilian 
authorities to present the needs of the Armed Forces more efficiently to other political 
figures, particularly the Finance and Economic Minister, and the electorate, in general.  
                                                 
28 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Ministry of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations”, Center for 
Civil – Military Relations Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.  (tbruneau@nps.navy.mil) 2001 
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Third, the MOD must maximize effective employment in the Armed Forces by 
implementing the policies and objectives of the Government in security and the defense 
of the nation. Finally, the MOD must ensure maximum efficiency in the use of resources 
like funds, personnel, and equipment.  
The MOD in Ghana by its establishment is responsible for the formulating 
policies associated with the operations of Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and the Veterans 
Association of Ghana (VAG) in the area of remuneration, provision of logistics and 
resources, which enable GAF and VAG to function efficiently. The MOD also works 
collaboratively with the National Security Council and the Armed Forces Council in 
formatting national defense policies related to internal and external security, the total 
defense of the nation, and peacekeeping operations. The MOD again prepares and 
defends its budgetary estimates in the area of defense before the Cabinet and the 
Parliament. Finally, the MOD provides political leadership, guidance and sound 
interpretation of government policies.39  
The parallel structures that exist under the MOD make it difficult for the military 
and civilian to fully understand each other when it comes to professional expertise. As 
stated by Max Weber, “bureaucracy rests upon expert training, a functional specialization 
of work, and an attitude set for habitual and virtuoso like mastery of single yet 
methodically integrated functions.”40 The MOD, therefore, needs to be equipped with an 
almost equal number of experts from both the military and civilian side so that when 
military issues are handled at the level of political decision-makers, the civilian 
representing the military can defend the military requirements. In doing so, civilians deal 
with their fellow civilian politicians while distancing the military from political influence. 
In addition, the military should structure its requirement for resources to meet the 
national security objectives. This can only be achieved if the bureaucrat and politician 
have a good understanding of the military institution and if the MOD has the required 
expertise to project the military. If the MOD is able to achieve these objectives, it can 
meet its goals at the lowest possible cost, have efficient use of limited resources, and 
                                                 
39 Address delivered by the Minister for Defense (Dr. Kwame Add Kufuor) to the members of the 
Council of State on November 29, 2001.  
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40 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press 
New York 1958) p. 229 
maintain absolute competence in the area of budget, personnel, acquisition and definition 
of roles and mission.  
The Minister for Defense, Dr. Kwame Addo Kufuor acknowledges that Ghana 
has gone through a number of problems with respect to civilian/military rule and will, 
therefore, have to handle the current democratic transition with caution. Nevertheless, he 
sees the present MOD and its structures for control as being very efficient. In his view all 
that the Minister should do in this transition period is pull the military together and move 
forward. As a Minister he sees himself as only a representative of the government not 
acting on his own but implementing the policies of the government and the President, 
who is the Commander-in-Chief.41 It is however, strongly advised that he considers 
reforming the institutional structures to facilitate greater understanding and cooperation 
between the civilian and military components in the MOD. 
 
C.   LEGISLATURE AND THE MILITARY        
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, just like most countries in the West African sub-
region, is silent on legislative oversight of the executive branch and the military. For the 
executive branch to be monitored so as not to interfere in the military institutions, some 
form of legislative oversight is strongly advisable. One of the most important problems in 
a democratic transition is the lack of dialogue between the legislature and the military. 
This problem has implications for consolidating democracy in terms of whether the 
legislature has the administrative capability to oversee military affairs in the area of 
operational and strategic capabilities with the military subordinating to civilian control. In 
the United States, for example, the Constitution makes provision for Congressional 
prerogatives, including the power to declare war, power of the purse, senate approval of 
all senior military appointments and the right to information from the Department of 
Defense.42 
                                                 
41 This was in an interview granted by the Minister for Defense, Dr. Kwame Addo Kufuor, on 
Tuesday December 17, 2001 at about 1300hrs in his office at Burma Camp, Accra. 
42 Article I Section 8 (14) of the Constitution of the United States. 
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Since these constitutional provisions establish the principle of civilian supremacy 
over the military, provisions are necessary for the subordination of the military to all 
three branches of government – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In Ghana, 
and in almost all the democracies in the West African sub-region, even though the 
National Assembly or Parliament has constitutional authority to declare war and vote on 
bills, they exercise very little or no control over the military. The control of the military 
and defense policies are decided at the level of the presidency in the Republics. This 
makes it more difficult for the military to stay neutral and apolitical. Opposition parties 
generally see the military as being on the side of the government and not the general 
population. For example in Cote d’lvoire, because of the executive branch’s control of 
the military, many Ivorians still regard the military with fear questioning the resources 
required to maintain the Army when the threat of external invasion or war is slim.43 On 
the other hand, the military resents the civilian lack of understanding of its role and the 
civilian unwillingness to fully appreciate the positive evolution (ethnic diversity and 
educated recruits) in the military structure and function. This lack of appreciation among 
the opposition parties and the general population could be improved through effective 
legislating and good checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. 
It is the norm in a democratic institution that only elected officials have the right 
to claim to represent the interest of the people. These officials have the power to delegate 
responsibility to other State institutions, such as the military. These institutions remain  
always accountable to the elected officials, and, therefore, the population. Additionally, 
for the legislature to abuse its authority is more difficult, since it comprises a group of 
individuals rather than a single person. Even though the President is an elected official, 
representing the majority, the interest of the minority has to be given due consideration, 
since the military serves the nation, not the majority. Without a constitutional provision 
to this effect, a country is destined to have problems with civil military relations. An 
example illustrating the power of the legislature is the United States Constitution, which 
listed 18 separate paragraphs on Congress’ power with 11 of these being related 
                                                 
43 The statement was contained in the report of the military and civilian delegation from Côte d'Ivoire 
that took part in the seminar in the role of the Legislative in National Defense and Security at Dakar, 
Senegal from April 20-22, 1999. Http://www.pdgs.org/partners/reporting.htm 
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explicitly to security.44 Within the legislative branch there is another check: 
bicameralism. The two separate chambers would have to agree independently on the need 
for an Army and the resources for its support. The U. S. Constitution divides power over 
the military so that neither the executive branch nor either of the two houses has full 
control over the military.  
In some of the third wave democracies like Ghana, there is insufficient legislative 
control; this is often symptomatic of the problems that legislatures face in asserting their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Constitutions are often silent on the role of 
parliaments in defense issues beyond implementing an armed force and the budget. Since 
the legislature has control over the budget, it can use its authority for some form of 
control over the military, resulting in an attempt to expand its level of influence over the 
executive branch and the military. In the long run, this serves the interest of the 
legislature and that of the military. Notable in Ghana and a good number of countries 
now transitioning/consolidating their democratic rule is that civilian control of the armed 
forces is being exercised almost exclusively through the executive branch. The legislature 
has always tried to distance itself from the military in the sub-region because it lacks the 
expertise and interest in matters that concern the military.  
In Ghana, for example, Article 210 Section (1) of the Constitution indicates that 
“there shall be the Armed Forces of Ghana, which shall consist of the Army, the Navy 
and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by the 
parliament.”45 Parliament after this has no legislative control or dealing with the 
military. Instead, Constitution has vested in the Armed Forces Council the authority to 
advise the President on matters of policy relating to defense and strategy, including the 
role of the Armed Forces, military budgeting and finance, administration and the 
promotion of officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent. The Armed 
Forces Council may, with the prior approval of the President, by constitutional 
instrument, make regulations for the performance of its functions under this Constitution 
                                                 
44 Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America. September17, 1787 
45 The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Article 210 Section (1). 
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or any other law, for the effective and efficient administration of the Armed Forces of 
Ghana.46  
There is a parliamentary sub-committee on defense in the legislating body. 
However, this sub-committee only checks the defense budget and submits it to the 
Parliament for approval. The legislature, therefore, exercises no oversight either over the 
military or the executive branch. The lack of oversight is an important factor that 
frequently ended the military in direct control and manipulation of the executive branch 
in most of the countries in the sub-region. The people of Ghana have, therefore, no way 
of contributing to how the military is employed or used to support the maintenance of 
internal security and national development. Due to the Parliament’s lack of oversight 
control on the military in Ghana, it has always criticized the military budget and, in some 
cases, has reduced it. The Parliament has no means of explaining the need for increasing 
defense spending to the general population, since those in the legislature do not even 
understand or know what is required of the military. This allows the President to suggest 
to the  military that the opposition in Parliament is against adequately funding the 
military, thus placing the military against the opposition parties.  
The Solicitor-General of Ghana, at the Attorney General’s Department, 
acknowledges the Constitution’s silence on legislative oversight control of the military 
and the problems, outlined above, that are likely to arise as a result. He further stated that 
even though the Ministry of Justice is very aware and active, its duties do not give it any 
right to propose changes to the Constitution and that the Parliament is responsible for 
raising the issue for debate and discussion. Once the proposals have been brought up and 
accepted by the legislative body, his outfit can amend the Constitution for approval by 
the Parliament.47  
An example of the legislature being bypassed on issues that affect defense and the 
nation is the disaster at the Accra Sports Stadium.  In this case, the Cabinet ordered an 
Emergency Response Unit (ERU) established under the military to handle emergencies 
because the military has the infrastructure for communicating and networking across the 
                                                 
46 Ibid. Article 214 
47 Interview with Mr. Emmanuel A. Addo, the Solicitor-General of Ghana at the Ministry of Justice 
and the Attorney-General’s Department on December 19, 2001. 
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country. The Minister for Defense, Dr. Kwame Addo Kufuor, responding to a question 
published in the Ghanaian Times Newspaper indicated that the Government has provided 
¢400 million (Cedis = ¢, is a symbol for currency used in Ghana) to refurbish 10 mini-
buses into fully furnished ambulances to facilitate the work of the Emergency Response 
Unit.48 The Unit will function well for now. However, next year when money is required 
to run it nationwide, problems will inevitably arise. The legislature will be reluctant to 
increase the defense budget to take care of the ERU, and the military will be equally 
reluctant to channel part of its limited budget into the ERU. As a result, the good 
intentions on which the ERU was established could vanish/disappear. This same unit 
would have functioned better if the Cabinet had put the need for the ERU before 
Parliament. The legislature would have passed the necessary laws to create the unit 
placing it under the military due to its advantages. It would, then, be the responsibility of 
the legislature each year to vote on funding for the ERU to operate, an addition to the 
defense budget. There is, therefore the need for the legislature to have representation on 
the Armed Forces Council, in order to advise referral of issues of these nature to 
Parliament. 
The ability of the legislature to exercise effective oversight, even with new 
Constitutional authority, will continue to be limited by its lack of expertise on military 
issues. This lack of expertise and interest on the part of the legislature in Ghana poses 
many challenges. These include a dearth of technical expertise in military issues, a lack 
of communication with their military counterparts, an inefficient use of the committee 
system, and inexperience with drafting legislation on defense issues. Until the democratic 
opening in the West African, defense policy and legislation drafting were traditionally the 
domain of a strong executive branch that also monopolized interactions with the military. 
As a result of this, legislatures in Ghana and elsewhere in the sub-region have been 
ineffective and have “rubber-stamped” whatever was forwarded to them by the executive 
branch. This ineffectiveness is partly due to economic and other constraints that 
legislatures in the third wave democracies face especially lack of supporting staff with 
the required expertise and training, and unaffordable technical advice from outside 
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48 The Ghanaian Times Newspaper publication of December 17, 2001. A new article was published 
for the Defense Minister’s, Dr. Kwame Addo Kufuor, in response to a question from the New Patriotic 
Party’s member of Parliament, Mr. Joseph Darko-Mensah, on the Emergency Response Unit. 
consultants. Even though former members of the military are possible sources of in-house 
expertise, they are rarely used, which is unexplainable. It is worthwhile for the legislature 
to take a second look at tapping into the expertise of retired military officers to build or 
enhance the capacity within the legislative branch to review and analyze defense related 
issues, including the budget.   
Increasing the interest of the legislature in defense issues will require legislative 
sub-committee on defense, to be fully accessed to achieve the desired goals. The 
members of the committee in Ghana could be given some incentives motivating them to 
learn more about defense while the military offers some personnel with expertise and 
experience to work for the committee. Important also is a balanced membership on the 
committee from both the ruling and the opposition parties ensuring fairness, and giving 
due consideration to selected members coming from constituencies with some military 
installations. These installations serve as a source of employment and also help to 
develop the areas. In countries where the members of the legislature are allowed to have 
their own staff, those on the legislative committee for defense should be certain that some 
of their staff have working knowledge in defense related issues. In the United States, for 
example, no two congressional offices are exactly alike. The personality, interest, 
constituency, and politics of the individual legislator shape each of the offices.49 
Resolving the problem of expertise will also address the issues of adequate and 
appropriate financing, and improved institutional communication between the legislature 
and the military. The existing communication gap between the legislative body and the 
military hinders the democratic process. The legislature must be well informed about the 
military, its operations, and its readiness if it is to effectively work with the military in 
promoting the national agenda. For its part the military must learn the most effective way 
of communicating with the legislature.  For example, by building skills for educating and 
informing the legislature, through other agencies.  
 
                                                 
49 A legislator will have to consider a State or District needs during the composition of his staff. A 
legislator with defense installations in his District or who happens to be a member of the Defense 
Committee will have to employ some staff with expertise in defense related issues. Congress and its 
Members, (R. Davidson & W. J. Oleszek 2000) 
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1.  Legislation  
The legislature is responsible for enacting laws to ensure that the military carries 
out its roles as stated in the national defense doctrine and also to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness. These can be laws that will cause changes in the military structure to suit 
the defense policy, laws on promotions, training, recruitment and even retirement and 
other benefits. An example is the Goldwater-Nicholls Act passed in 1986.50 This act had 
a profound impact on how the United States military works and collaborates among its 
members. It reduced the authority of the Chiefs of Staffs of the various services and 
strengthened the control of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it required more 
joint planning and joint operations to insure a unified defense posture as opposed to each 
service going alone.      
2. Oversight and Sanctions  
Legislative oversight is the most important means by which the legislature can 
monitor the executive’s misuse of the military while at the same time providing diffused 
civilian oversight over the military. Since the legislatures are the elected representatives 
of the people, their oversight is viewed as that of the citizenry over the military. The 
defense budgeting process is a vital tool of parliamentary control over the military and 
added to that are the processes of monitoring, inspecting, conducting routine testimonies, 
seding auditors to the military and waiting for media denunciation.   
Defense spending should, in most cases, be within what the government can 
afford. In addition, the Defense Ministry should compete with other government 
ministries because the overall budget must be a monetary expression of the priorities of 
the nation. The legislature’s committee on defense must be able to justify the Defense 
Ministry’s request of allocated resources for training, personnel, and equipment to reflect 
the role and mission of the Armed Forces in achieving the national security objectives. 
This can only be done if Ghana’s parliamentary sub-committee on the defense’s staff 
interacts with the staff in the executive branch as well as the Ministry of Defense to 
                                                 
50 This was a committee headed by Senator Goldwater, which was commissioned to draft the DOD 
reorganization Act of 1986. after series of failed joint attempts by the US military in specific operations, 
such as the Iranian Hostage issue and the Lebanon Hostage problem. It was to  find the best way for the 
United State armed services to work jointly as a unified body. 
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discuss programs, collect information important for defense funding and to make policy 
decisions.  
Their institutional knowledge allows them to question the military on key 
issues/programs intelligently and to report back to the Parliament during formal debate on 
the military budget. The budget proposal from the Defense Ministry through the 
executive branch is the most important document requiring enough details to clearly 
instruct the legislature in what they are approving or rejecting. The oversight mechanism 
for monitoring the military by the legislature has worked quite well in Benin. It includes 
the right of voting on the military budget, the power to declare war, and the power to 
declare a state of siege, upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers. As a 
result, meaningful/productive communications have taken place between the executive 
branch and the legislature, and the legislature has, on many occasions, called on 
government and defense officials to testify before various committees during its yearly 
reviews of the military budget.51  
In view of the limited amount of cooperation between the legislature and the 
military with respect to legislative oversight, problems of perception and communication 
still persist between civilians and the military in Ghana. The political leaders and civil 
society are still suspicious of the Armed Forces because of its track record of political 
intervention throughout the period of Ghana’s democratic history. Significant progress 
has, however, been made in other countries in the sub-region. For example in Mali, some 
headway has been made in establishing effective legislative oversight and improving on 
the public perception of the Armed Forces. 
 Article 70, 71, 72, and 75 of the Malian Constitution provide the National 
Assembly with the right to legislate on defense matters and to declare war or state of 
emergency.52 The assembly examines the defense budget each year, reviews it, and 
approves legislation concerning the organization of the national defense, the military 
code of justice, creation of military security units and the reorganization of the Armed 
Forces. This example illustrates the use of the legislature in effectively conducting 
                                                 
51 Ibid, Seminar reports on legislature and civil-military relation. Dakar, Senegal 1999. 
52 Ibid, This was in the report of the Malian delegation to the seminar. 
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oversight control over the executive branch and the military in a democracy, 
demonstrating that the legislature is not just in control of the defense budget.         
The legislature must be able to have an effective monitoring mechanism over the 
executive branch with respect to military activities and the military itself. This ensures 
that the military only does what it is supposed to do helping it to build upon its efficiency 
and professionalism. The legislature should be able to commission auditors to audit the 
military from time to time and also establish inspection boards in countries with no 
Inspector Generals. These boards ensure that funds are allocated to the military for the 
reasons given in the approved budget statement. The legislature in Ghana should have the 
power to sanction the military, possibly in the form of a cut in military funding for 
projects or, in some cases, a full withdrawal of funds. This, however, has to be done with 
extreme caution in other not to undermine the military’s ability to perform its assigned 
roles, or to reduce the level of its professionalism.  
Finally, in exercising effective oversight over the military, the legislature must 
attend to military issues raised in the media. The media can be an effective oversight tool, 
since it is in constant touch with the people. The media is able to detect the general 
feelings of the population and point out issues requiring the attention of the executive and 
legislative branches. Because there is freedom of the press and rule of law in Ghana, the 
media address issues affecting the military, which are of public concern.  
 
D.  EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 
Intelligence activities, which hitherto were being carried out to suit whichever 
government was in power were brought under some form of control following the 
passage of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996, (Act 526) Under the Act, 
there is the National Security Council, Regional and District Security councils, and the 
Internal and External Intelligence agencies, the National Security Coordinator and the 
Complaints Tribunal and Warrant.   
The Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), responsible for domestic 
intelligence, and the Research Department, responsible for external intelligence, operate 
directly under the National Security Council. The Research Department is not on ground, 
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so the BNI has assumed domestic  and assisting the military in external intelligence 
external activities. The Defense Intelligence Department is directly under the Chief of 
Defense Staff but only falls under the National Security Council when its operations are 
of national interest. This is the precise point to draw the line for the defense intelligence 
agencies’ involvement in domestic political issues. Since the President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as well as the Chairman of the National 
Security Council, separating domestic intelligence agencies from the military intelligence 
units becomes difficult. One effective way in which this can be managed is to have an 
oversight mechanism in place to ensure no crossovers.  
The Act also makes provision for the President to appoint a minister responsible 
for national security who would submit a report to Parliament on the intelligence 
agencies each year.55 Section 18 of the Act also allows the appointment of a coordinator 
by the President to coordinate the activities of the intelligence agencies. The coordinator 
is accountable to the President through the Minister responsible for national security.  
In accordance with the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996, Act 256 
the Directorate of Defense Intelligence was not only re-established to operate under the 
Ministry of Defense, but also to function as one of the Intelligence agencies under the 
National Security Affairs. In an interview with the Director General of Defense 
Intelligence (DGDI), he outlined his duties as overseeing authority coordinating the 
functions of the intelligence directorates of the three (3) services under the MOD. He is 
also an adviser to the Chief of Defense Staff/Minister for Defense on internal and 
external threats to the security of Ghana in which he measures what is necessary to 
counter such threats. As a member of the National Security Council and the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, he advises those bodies on all matters relating to defense 
intelligence. This structure of responsibilities shows that the MOD, and the National 
Security Council are consumers of defense intelligence products. This, therefore, draws 
the defense intelligence outfit into domestic intelligence because it can be used to feed 
the executive branch. When the Director-General Defense Intelligence was asked how far 
into civil society the defense intelligence activities extended, he stated, “As one of the 
                                                 
55 Part III of Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526 (1996) Section 17. 
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national intelligence assets, the Defense Intelligence Department contributes to the 
achievement of the following strategic goals which are all for the well-being of the civil 
society:  
(i) Collect, analyze, retain and disseminate as appropriate, information 
and intelligence in respect of activities that may constitute threats to 
the security of the State and the Government of Ghana. 
(ii) Safeguard the economic well being of the State against threats posed 
by the acts or omissions of persons or organizations both within and 
outside the country. 
(iii) Protect the State against threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, 
hijacking, piracy, drug trafficking, etc. 
(iv) Protect the State against the activities of persons, both nationals and 
non-nationals, intended to overthrow the Government of Ghana or 
undermine the constitutional order through illegal, political, military, 
industrial or other means or through any other unconstitutional 
methods.” 56 
The Department of Defense Intelligence has autonomy over all defense 
intelligence related matters, but the National Security Council coordinates its activities at 
the national level. The Department has ,therefore, a very close liaison with other sister 
intelligence agencies. Even though the Defense Intelligence Agency has no power of 
arrest, the constitution makes provision for that under the Security and Intelligence 
Agencies Act.57  
As stated in the National Security and Intelligence Act, funding for all the 
intelligence agencies is provided by the Parliament from the Consolidated Fund, which is 
under the executive. The coordinator accounts for the use of the funds with proper 
records to the National Security Council. Even though Parliament approves the use of 
                                                 
56 Interview, granted by Brigadier-General Adu-Amanfo, Director -General Defense Intelligence on 
December 24, 2001. 
57 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (1996), Act 526 (20) States that “Where a Director of an 
intelligence agency or an employee designated by him, has reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant is 
required to enable the agency perform any of its functions under this Act. Director or the designated 
employee may apply for the issue of a warrant.” 
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funds, it has no control over the amount or its use, and therefore no control over the 
intelligence agencies. 
Democratic governance requires a delicate balance between intelligence agencies 
need for secrecy and democracy’s need for transparency. Although secrecy is important, 
transparency is critical for limiting the autonomy of the intelligence agencies and 
maintaining their accountability. Since the balance in Ghana continues to be weighted 
towards secrecy, this thesis analyzes intelligence cycles in general and advocates their 
adoption in Ghana for the purpose of balancing  secrecy, trust and transparency. The six 
steps in the intelligence process, as identified by Mark M. Lowenthal, are planning and 
direction, collection, processing/exploitation, analysis/production, 
dissemination/consumption and feedback.58 
The policymakers’ articulation of priorities and requirements are very important 
in the planning and direction of the intelligence community. The intelligence process 
must be transparent and understood by the policymakers to facilitate efficacy, knowledge 
of their primary client, and the bureaucratic decision-making process in general. In a 
democratic consolidation period, this is essential because intelligence agencies are 
generally highly autonomous and secretive prior and during transitions to democratic 
rule. As the situation changes, policymakers must continuously provide feedback to the 
intelligence agencies to keep them focused on the issues most important for national 
security, and, in return, intelligence agencies must request clarification, providing 
feedback to policymakers on a continual basis. 
Collection is the gathering of information from various sources, which the BNI in 
Ghana does very well.  This information could be from open-sources, state records, such 
as tax returns, wire tapping, confidential records, surveillance and human collection. 
Even though the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996 (Act 526) is in place to 
guide intelligence agencies, it cannot wholly prevent human rights abuses or guarantee 
effective civilian control over intelligence. An effective collection mechanism must 
include oversight, proper functioning and empowered institutions, and a professionalized 
bureaucracy. The problem with the collection process may be the gathering of too much 
                                                 
58 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy. CQ Press Washington D. C. 2000. p 40-50 
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information, which undermines the intelligence agencies ability to accurately meet the 
needs of policymakers. In some cases intelligence collection responsibilities overlap with 
the power of arrest. However, keeping collection and power of arrest separated satisfies 
the need of preventing its abuse. Those collecting information should not have power to 
detain or arrest. This ability needs to remain with civil law enforcement to ensure that 
civil liberties and legal standards are upheld. 
Refining of raw data from the collection process into a usable product for analysis 
and production is defined as processing and exploitation eliminating unnecessary 
intelligence that has been gathered. Analysis provides civil and military policymakers 
with information directly related to the issues they face and the decisions they have to 
make.59 This is the point where data refined during the processing stage is turned into a 
useable product in the analysis phase that requires a lot of training and expertise. 
Although a competitive analysis is viewed as being quite good in giving a balanced 
analysis of an issue, its negative implications on a small country like Ghana creates an 
increased bureaucracy and contributes to information overload on the policymakers. 
Ghana can, therefore, make do with the intelligence agencies that are presently in 
existence under the BNI and the Defense Intelligence from time to time. Any attempt at 
creating a parallel agency to the BNI might require more funding and resources, which 
are scarce. 
Dissemination in the intelligence cycle is the phase where the refined product of 
intelligence is made available to the policymakers and other key personnel. The 
information must be presented without any filtrations even when it is coming from the 
defense intelligence outfit.  This information must be provided directly to the consumer, 
whether it is the military chief or the executive branch. Continuous feedback between 
intelligence analysts and the policymakers must be conducted throughout all stages of the 
intelligence process and, at the same time, feedback must be shared between the 
intelligence agencies themselves in producing an intelligence product. Oversight of the 
intelligence agencies by the executive branch, the legislature and the judicial branch are 
                                                 
59 Ibid, 75. 
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very important to ensure that the intelligence apparatus is used properly for the stability 
of the nation. 
Oversight is the ability to control the intelligence processes. However, too much   
oversight can make the intelligence apparatus inefficient, preventing it from carrying out 
its function of protecting the nation effectively. Too little oversight could lead to a strong, 
autonomous intelligence service that threatens the stability of the nation. Oversight is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a good intelligence service. Contrarily, 
budgetary control, responsiveness to policy needs, internal control of operations, as well 
as professionalism of employees are other aspects that clearly impact the efficacy of an 
intelligence organization. These allow the civil society to penetrate the workings of the 
intelligence apparatus.  Moreover, caution must be taken to balance the need for secrecy 
and the need for transparency, which is so crucial in democratic consolidation. Covert 
operations are defined as “an activity or activities of a government to influence political, 
economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of that 
government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”60 Although these activities 
are not part of the intelligence process, by their nature, they are usually attached to the 
process. In a country like Ghana, which is in the process of democratic consolidation, 
separating covert operations from the intelligence process is imperative in maintaining 
the confidence of the population in the intelligence apparatus. 
 
E.   CONCLUSION 
Civilian control of the military in Ghana, and elsewhere in West Africa, has been 
vested in the executive branch of the government. Even though there are 
parliaments/national assemblies in all the countries, constitutional provisions only give 
these bodies the authority to raise an armed force. This leaves too much room for the 
executive to interfere with military institutions and structures and, in some cases, to 
hijack the military, using it to suppress opposition parties. In Ghana, the Constitution 
creates the Council of State and the Armed Forces Council as checks and balances to 
avoid bestowing absolute power on the executive or any branch of government. However, 
                                                 
60 Ibid. Mark M. Lowenthal, 106. 
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the composition of the membership of these bodies are such that the President can at any 
time play the military to his or her side. Analysis and recommendations for reform have 
been made to ensure that the checks and balances work properly. Even though Ghana has 
a Ministry of Defense, which is to be the link between the President and the military, it 
has not functioned properly because of the lack of civilian expertise, and balanced 
staffing by military and civilians.  
Legislative oversight is required as a means of ensuring that the military does 
what is required while remaining accountable to elected officials and thus the population. 
However, the legislature remains ineffective because of constraints facing the third wave 
democracies, for example the lack of supporting staff with the required expertise and 
training. The legislature should tap into the expertise of retired military officers to 
increase the capability of reviewing and analyzing defense related issues, including 
budgets. 
Additionally a well-informed legislature in the area of the military’s operations 
and its readiness can more easily cooperate with the military to promote the national 
agenda. The legislative committee on defense must be able to justify the Defense 
Ministry’s request for allocation of resources for training, personnel, and equipment to 
reflect the role and mission of the Armed Forces in achieving the national security 
objective. It is, therefore, valuable for Ghana to draw from the experience of Mali. 
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996, Act 526, has restructured the 
intelligence agencies and their activities. Intelligence gathering is highly important to the 
existence of any government. In any democratic system, caution is advisable in the 
operations of the intelligence agencies. This ensures that in the government’s bid to 
operate in secrecy, they will try to balance it with transparency to order to retain the 
confidence of the general population. Effort should also be made to separate defense 






The military in Ghana has been involved in politics since the pre-colonial period. 
The Ashanti Empire, which forms part of the present day Ghana, emerged around 1700 
principally by waging wars of conquest against other states. The British used the military 
force that was in existence in the Gold Coast and the rest of the West African colonies to 
form the nucleus of the Royal West Africana Frontier Force (RWAFF). As far back as 
1898, the Gold Coast provided a quota of the RWAFF, which was used extensively in the 
World Wars and the control of the Colonial States in the region. The British relied on the 
military of the then British West Africa to defeat the Ashanti Empire and in the Gold 
Coast the military was always called upon by the British to maintain order and ensure 
smooth functioning of the colony by, engaging in police duties, suppressing internal 
unrest and rebellions. On attainment of independence in 1957, under Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the British presence remained in 
Ghana’s military with 200 British officers as against 25 junior Ghanaian officers.  
Dr Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup following his creation of one 
party state, run down of the Ghanaian economy, interference in the military structures 
and the creation of a parallel military force, Presidents own Guard regiment (POGR). 
Following the coup of 1966, there has been three more intervention in Ghana with the 
reasons for that being: economic mismanagement; suppression of opposition activities; 
interference in military institutions and structures; and disregard for human rights. The 
military in all the intervention have ruled alongside with the same civilians that they had 
overthrown. This has been so because of total lack of expertise on the part of the military. 
The military having been involved in the first coup, found itself as part of the political 
system and since they are managers of violence in any governmental apparatus decided to 
evoke on themselves the power to ensure good governance and accountability.   
Intelligence institutions and apparatus have suffered under all the form of 
governments that Ghana has had since independence. Governments have always tried to 
use the intelligence agencies to perpetuate their stay in power. This has led to intelligence 
organizations being perceived by the general population and those in the opposition as a 
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threat to their existence. So every change in government has resulted in the intelligence 
apparatus being dismantled or some of those working in the service being sacked. This 
has always affected their efficiency and professionalism because of lack of continuity. 
The civilian control of the military in Ghana and almost the whole of West Africa 
have been vested in the executive branch of the government. Even though there are 
parliaments/national assemblies in all the countries, the constitutional provisions only 
give these bodies the authority to raise an armed force. This gives room for the executive 
to interfere with the military institutions and structures and, in some cases, to hijack the 
military using it to suppress the opposition parties. In Ghana, the Constitution has created 
the Council of State and the Armed Forces Council as a means of checks and balances to 
avoid bestowing absolute power on the executive or any branch of government. The 
composition of the membership of these bodies are such that the President can at any 
time play the military to his or her side. Analysis and recommendations have been made 
ensuring that the checks and balances will work properly. Even though Ghana has a 
Ministry for Defense, which is to be the link between the President and the military, it has 
not functioned properly because of the lack of civilian expertise, and balanced staffing by 
both military and civilians.  
Legislative oversight is required as a means of ensuring that the military does 
what is required while remaining accountable to the elected officials, thus, the 
population. Nonetheless, the legislature has been ineffective because of constraints facing 
the third wave democracies, for example the lack of supporting staff with the required 
expertise and training. Additionally, a well-informed legislature in the area of the 
military’s operations will help promote the national security agenda. The legislative 
committee on defense must be able to justify the Defense Ministry’s request for 
allocation of resources for training, personnel, and equipment to reflect the role and 
mission of the Armed Forces in achieving the national security objective. It is, therefore, 
valuable for Ghana to draw from the experience of Mali. 
The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996, Act 526, has restructured the 
intelligence agencies and their activities. Intelligence gathering is highly important to the 
existence of any government. In any democratic system, caution is advisable in the 
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operations of the intelligence agencies. This ensures that in the government’s bid to 
operate in secrecy, they will try to balance it with transparency to order to retain the 
confidence of the general population. Effort should also be made to separate defense 
intelligence operations from national security activities. 
1) The following are, therefore, proposed as a framework to ensure objective 
civilian control of the military in a democratic consolidation and also as a 
means of prevent military intervention in Ghana’s democratic system:  
2) Executive branch nominations and appointments of members of Council 
of State must be equal to or less than those elected from the ten regions of 
Ghana. 
3) The executive branch must try as much as possible not to interfere with 
the military structures and institutions. 
4) There should not be any parallel military unit/organization established 
solely to protect the executive. 
5) The MOD must be equipped with equal numbers of experts from the 
military and civilian sides so that when military issues are handled at the 
level of political decision makers, the civilians representing the military 
can defend the requirements. 
6) The military must structure its requirements for resources to meet the 
national security objectives. This can be achieved if the civilians and the 
politicians are given a good understanding of the military institution. 
7) The structure and membership of the Armed Forces Council as established 
in the Constitution will have to be amended and the name changed to 
Defense Committee. Its composition should include the original military 
component of the Council, the Vice President as chairman, and the 
parliamentary sub-committee for defense, (with fair representation of all 
political parties in Parliament) to ensure the military is apolitical. 
8) The legislature must have support staff with expertise and training. 
Expertise of retired military officers should be tapped to enhance the 
capacity of the legislative branch to review and analyze defense related 
issues. 
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9) Members of the legislative sub-committee on defense must be given 
incentives to motivate them to learn more about the military. 
10) To ensure that the members of the committee take interest in military 
issues, members selected for the defense committee should come from 
constituencies with military installations if possible. 
11) The military must learn to educate and inform the legislature through the 
MOD and other agencies 
12) The legislature must be able to commission auditors to audit the military 
from time to time. 
13) The legislative sub-committee on defense must have total control and 
confidence in defending military budget on behalf of the military. 
14) The legislature must be able to sanction the military. 
15) Issues raised in the media about the military must receive quick response 
from the legislature to ensure their oversight control. 
16) There must be intelligence oversight mechanism in place to ensure that 
there are no crossovers between domestic intelligence agencies and 
military intelligence activities. 
17) Intelligence organization’s need for secrecy must be balanced with 
democracy’s need for transparency. 
18) Intelligence collection must be kept separate from powers of arrest to 
protect the intelligence agencies and their abuse of the power. 
19) There must be oversight of the intelligence agencies from the executive, 
legislature and judicial branches. 
20) To maintain the confidence of the population in intelligence apparatus, 
covert activities must be separated from national intelligence processes. 
21) There must be clear separation between national domestic intelligence 
activities and military intelligence operations in order to maintain the 





Michael N. Barnett,  Confronting the Cost of War. (Princeton University Press 1992) 
Samuel P. Huntington,  The Soldier and the State. (Harvard University Press, London, 
fourteenth printing 2000. 
 Douglas L. Bland, “Unified Theory of Civil Military Relations”. Armed Forces & 
Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, Fall 1999 
Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique; the Question of Civil control.” 
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 23, No2, Winter 1996. 
Henry H. Gaffney Jr, Why Should Civilian Control the Military and How should They 
Do it. Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper 538/June 1996 Virginia. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 
C. W. Newbury, British Policy Towards West Africa. ( Clarendon press Oxford 1965) 
Osei Akwasi P., Ghana : Recurrence and Change in a Post-Independence African State. 
P. Lang: New York,1999. 
Donald I. Ray, Ghana Politics, Economics and Society. (Frances Printer Ltd U.K. 1986) 
Sandbrook Richard, Reforming the Political Kingdom: Governance and Development in 
Ghana’s fourth Republic. Accra 1999. 
Jackson Kofi Abaka, When the Gun rule, Accra Woeli Pub Ghana 1999.  
Florence M. Bourret, The Road to Independence (Stanford University Press CA. 1960)  
Dan-Bright S. Dzorgbo, Ghana in Search of Development, The challenge of Governance, 
Economic Management and Institution Building. Ashgate Publishing England, 2001. 
Paul Nugent, The Flight- Lieutenant Rides (to power) again: National delusions, local 
fixations and the 1996 Ghanaian elections. Edinburgh University, 1998.    
Kofi B. Quantson, Ghana: Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector. 
NPASCOM Ltd Accra Ghana. Revised Edition 2000 
Ghana: Transition to Democracy, Edited by Kwame A. Ninsin, Codesria, Dakar Senegal 
1998. 
Kwesi Yankah, Free Speech in Traditional Society. University of Ghana Press 1998. 
Ghana Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526 (1996) 
57 
The Constitution of United States of America. 1787. 
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Fron Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford 
University Press New York 1958. 
Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and its Members, CQ Press 
Washington, D. C. Sevent edition 2000. 































INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1.  Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2.  Dudley Knox Library 
       Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Dr. Kwame  Addo Kufuor  
      Minister for Defence  
Burma Camp, Accra  
Ghana 
 
4. The Chief of Defence Staff 
General Headquarters  
Burma Camp, Accra  
Ghana 
 
5. Rear Admiral John Gbana  
Chief of Naval Staff 
Naval Headquarters 
      Burma Camp, Accra 
Ghana 
 
6. Brig Adu Amanfo  
DGDI 
General Headquarters 
Burma Camp, Accra 
Ghana 
 
7. Mr. Mpare 
Chief Director 
Ministry of Defence 
      Burma Camp, Accra 
Ghana 
 
8. Professor Thomas C. Bruneau 






9. Professor Letitia Lawson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
10. Center for Civil-Military Relations 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
11. Commander Michael Addison 
P. O. Box CT2514 
Cantonments 
      Accra, Ghana 
 
 
60 
